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In1 an article entitled ‘Philosophy’s Gaudy Dress: Rhetoric and Fantasy in the 
Lockean Social Contract’, Linda Zerilli draws our attention to a section in An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding that John Locke added in its fourth 
edition of 1700, four years before his death. The section is entitled ‘Of the As-
sociation of Ideas’. She claims this section introduces a kind of torsion into his 
Essay because it goes against the grain of his otherwise consistent and loud val-
orisation of reason and correspondingly loud castigation of rhetoric as a ‘gaudy 
dress’ or, more straightforwardly, as ‘the Abuse of Words’.
In that section he appears to reveal a more ambivalent attitude toward rhetoric 
and an at least implicit recognition of the powerful grip that certain chance as-
sociations can exert over us. Consider the following extract:
It is of a young gentleman, who having learnt to dance, and that to great perfection, 
there happened to stand an old trunk in the room where he learnt. The idea of this 
remarkable piece of household stuff, had so mixed itself with the turns and steps of 
all his dances that, though in that chamber he could dance excellently well, yet it was 
only whilst that trunk was there; nor could he perform well in any other place, unless 
that, or some such other trunk had its due position in the room.
John Locke (1993: 222–223), Book 2, Chapter 33, Paragraph 16
In light of this, Zerilli imagines Locke asking himself: well, ‘if a trunk can take 
on such significance for a Gentleman, what is to keep another equally unre-
markable object from assuming the same strange status in the subject’s fantasy 
life? The answer is: nothing – [and] therein lies the disruptive power of associa-
tion for an education in reason’ (Zerilli 2005: 152). In drawing out the implica-
1 I am deeply indebted to my many interlocutors over the years, whose very helpful feedback 
was received while presenting aspects of earlier versions of this paper at the following uni-
versities: Liege (Oct 2008), Essex (Dec 2008), Oxford (March 2009), Cyprus (March 2010), UCL 
(May 2010), and San Juan (Aug 2010).
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tions of this insight for an analysis of the Lockean social contract Zerilli draws 
on the Italian philosopher Ernesto Grassi, arguing that rhetoric and fantasy are 
a potent ‘source of inventive political and philosophical thinking’ and ‘the very 
“ground” of rational thought’ (Zerilli 2006: 479).
In a similar way it has been suggested that ‘there is no way of understanding po-
litical identities and destinies without letting fantasy into the frame’. So claims 
Jacqueline Rose in her book States of Fantasy because, for her, it is fantasy that 
provides the sticky psychic glue that binds together the elements of social and 
political reality (Rose 1996: 4). Far from confining fantasy to the private life of 
the individual, fantasy is here understood to play a crucial role in forging a peo-
ple’s collective and political will.2
And yet the category of fantasy rarely features in the debates of political theo-
rists and philosophers. Rose suggests that ‘[o]ne of the reasons the idea of fan-
tasy has a hard time getting into the political argument is… because it is seen as 
threatening political composure’ (Rose 1996: 7). By this I take her to be making 
the point that talking about fantasy in a formal context defined by the domi-
nant, disciplinary norms of political science threatens to reproduce the erst-
while experience of bringing up the topic of sex with one’s parents. Reacting 
in this way, however, risks overlooking a crucial point about political life. For 
political authority and people’s obedience are rooted in the hopes and fears that 
our fantasies help dramatize. In this vein Rose points to Max Weber’s insight 
that, beyond tradition, charisma, and legality, the obedience of the people rests 
on ‘fear of the vengeance of magical powers or of the power-holder, [and] hope 
for reward in this world or in the world beyond’ (Weber 1991: 79, as cited in Rose 
1996: 8).
2 It is clear that the appeals to the term ‘fantasy’ are not so infrequent in the context of so-
cial and political studies, as well as political journalism and the media at large. ‘As the job 
market plunges, the fantasy politics prevail’ – so reads one of Polly Toynbee’s headlines. Or 
elsewhere, she summarizes a prevalent, though often unstated, collective desire in terms of a 
plea: ‘Please can we have our bubble back’. This is the way Polly Toynbee (2009) expresses the 
unstated wish animating the collective complicity of ‘just about everyone’ to return to busi-
ness as usual in the wake of the credit crunch.  That the full extent of the fall-out has yet to 
become clear has not prevented governments, investors, entrepreneurs, especially homeown-
ers and consumer-citizens in general, wanting a quick return to the alleged ‘good old days’. 
‘Please can we have our bubble back’ summarizes the all too palpable fear that the chance for 
meaningful, structural change might already be lost.
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A recent analysis of the American social and political landscape takes this in-
sight to heart. In her book The Terror Dream: Fear and Fantasy in Post 9/11 Amer-
ica Susan Faludi charts how, in the wake of 9/11, there was a sustained effort 
by the media, entertainment, and advertising industries to graft a very specific 
fantasy onto America’s psychic wound, based on the Cold War narrative, par-
ticularly of the 1950s. The Cold War narrative was successfully installed not sim-
ply on account of the sheer force of intent, backed by huge resources, but also 
because it tapped into memories and fantasmatic evocations of the baby-boom 
childhood of ‘nuclear family “togetherness”, redomesticated femininity, [and] 
Cold Warrior manhood’ (Faludi 2007: 4).
Folded into this narrative, of course, were all the Hollywood classics of this pe-
riod, especially the John Wayne films, to which the Turner Broadcasting Corpo-
ration devoted all of its Christmas 2001 programming. A massive array of me-
dia, entertainment, and advertising outlets spun a seductive web of ‘rescue and 
protect’ fantasies about revenge and American invincibility; about male virility, 
feminine frailty and childhood vulnerability. By the end of 2005 the airwaves 
were packed with ‘cowboy-code-of-honour types who never throw the first 
punch but are relentless and invincible once riled’ (Faludi 2007: 8).  In these im-
ages and a whole array of accompanying statements Faludi discerns an under-
lying ‘Lone Ranger’/‘Dirty Harry’ fantasy of the John Wayne or Clint Eastwood 
types, reinforced by media portrayals of George W. Bush’s cowboy dress and 
swagger. This ‘rescue and protect’ fantasy was disseminated with gusto to the 
American public (and beyond) – a public which appeared ready and willing to 
embrace it.
Why does Faludi take an interest in these fantasies? She does so because they 
carry consequences (Faludi 2007: 380). Their wide dissemination and consump-
tion make sense of many things according to her, including the comparative 
absence in the US media of public democratic contestation of US foreign policy; 
draconian curtailment of civil liberties; and regression in matters of women’s 
security and political voice, both at home and abroad. (Faludi is, of course, keen 
to point out that these consequences result not only or even primarily because 
of fantasy.) Fantasies facilitate, or contribute to, these consequences according 
to Faludi because they shape the way we ‘see’ reality, including its problems and 
solutions, and therefore they structure the way we act in the world. Faludi takes 
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special note of the widespread and widely tolerated denigration of women that, 
she feels, is a direct result of women departing from the scripts of constructed 
rescue fantasies (Faludi 2007: 23-57).3 A key part of this construction process 
involved placing women in the position of someone in need of rescue and pro-
tection. In this regard, she trains her critical gaze on the widespread and widely 
disseminated stories in which women and children appear as victims. As Faludi 
puts it:
In the post-9/11 reenactment of the fifties Western, women figured largely as vul-
nerable maidens. Never mind that the fatalities that day were three-to-one male-to 
female and that most of the female office workers at the World Trade Center (like 
their male counterparts) rescued themselves by walking down the stairs on their 
own two feet…
(Faludi 2007: 6–7)
According to Faludi this myth was so powerful that it was immune to what 
she calls ‘the antibiotics of common sense or statistical hard evidence’ (Faludi 
2007: 186).4
Taken together these claims appear to suggest that Faludi thinks we need to 
get ‘closer’ to reality and that fantasies are to be defined and evaluated on the 
basis of their ability or inability to reflect that reality faithfully. So the politi-
cal and ideological significance of fantasy is understood here as a function of 
a ‘correspondence theory of truth’, a view which is widely held by others, in-
cluding journalists, as well as many academics who appreciate the symbolic 
significance of political argument. Fantasy, then, tends to be construed as a kind 
of false-consciousness. More than that, we might add that fantasy tends to be 
construed as a kind of bad, or morally regressive, false-consciousness.
3 Rescue fantasies are opposed by Faludi to female liberation for example (Faludi 2007: 54).
4 For Faludi this is a product not just of the power and political economy of the media in the US, 
but also because these stories tap into a specific cultural history that succeeds in interpellat-
ing a good portion of the public (Aitkenhead, D. ‘9/11 Ripped the Bandage off US Culture’, The 
Guardian, 18 February 2008). The fact that several narratives (eg., the Pearl Harbour narrative) 
were attempted shortly after 9/11, but failed to interpellate, suggests that ‘successful myths’ 
need some form of background historical and experiential validation, including fantasmatic 
resonance.
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Insightful and informative as Faludi’s work is, the way she relates fantasy to ‘re-
ality’ and to questions of critique tends to underestimate the complexity of their 
relation and thus the strategic and tactical challenges facing those who might 
wish to contest and transform that reality. In order to make sense of this claim, I 
explore the appeal and content of the category of fantasy, situating my remarks 
in relation to a critical political theory, by which I mean a theory grounded in a 
political ontology that offers a basis for problem-driven empirical research but 
also a rationale for both normative and ideological critique. Apart from Susan 
Faludi’s work, I draw on the political analytical work of William Connolly, Jac-
queline Rose, and Judith Butler, among others, using them as case illustrations 
with which to consider the explanatory and critical implications of the concept 
of fantasy for questions of identity, political identity in particular.
Why Fantasy?
Despite the above-noted tendency to construe fantasy in predominantly episte-
mological terms, as illusion or myth, there remain good reasons to affirm fantasy 
as a productive analytical and critical category. The attraction of the concept of 
fantasy can be understood in part by reflecting on the emergence and develop-
ment of poststructuralist political theory and analysis. Central, in this regard, 
are what have been labelled the linguistic and affective ‘turns’. The linguistic 
turn (Rorty 1967) signalled an appreciation of the symbolic dimension of political 
practices (Edelman 1964), especially the importance of discourse and identity in 
thinking about political mobilization. Nationalist, feminist, environmental, and 
gay and lesbian movements elevated in importance the stories people tell each 
other in shaping their identity. More importantly, it highlighted the constructed 
character of identity and discourse, calling for subjects to affirm this constructed 
and contingent character (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Connolly 1995).
These developments were welcomed by many because they marked a move be-
yond standard analyses that emphasized the ‘givenness’ of class, gender, and 
other interests. They pluralized perspectives on political mobilization and en-
gagement beyond those grounded in interest-based rationalities. Nevertheless, 
there were many who felt that emphasizing the contingent and constructed 
character of discourse and identity underestimated the inertia and force of so-
cial norms and practices. According to this view, the roles of emotions and pas-
sions had been neglected – or at least had not been given their proper due. The 
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so-called ‘affective turn’ thus indicates a need or demand to acknowledge af-
fects as central to political theory and analysis (cf. Massumi 1996; Ahmed 2004; 
Stavrakakis, 2007).
The influence of Lacan’s work on these two ‘turns’ (the linguistic turn and the 
affective turn) is fairly clear. One can think, for instance, of the turn to Lacan’s 
‘point de capiton’ by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in their Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy (1985). One can also appeal to the importance attributed to the 
category of enjoyment (jouissance) by many scholars in the study of political 
phenomena, especially in relation to the ‘grip’ of ideology (Glynos 2001; see also 
Glynos & Stavrakakis 2004 and Žižek 1989).
The category of fantasy, together with associated concepts like identification, 
split subjectivity, the unconscious, and so on, can be invoked as a key category 
because it captures the combined centrality of the symbolic and affective dimen-
sions of social and political life. This is something that has been emphasized by 
Laclau himself in relation to the category of discourse (see, for example, Laclau 
in Glynos & Stavrakakis 2010; see also Glynos & Stavrakakis 2008). To date, how-
ever, there have been few systematic attempts to ascertain in a general way the 
political and ideological significance of fantasy. Moreover, most analyses that 
invoke the term ‘fantasy’ rarely elaborate the ontological, conceptual, and meth-
odological parameters in detail or unproblematically, and so I believe we still 
need to determine the specificity and worth of the category of fantasy for critical 
political theory and analysis in a more systematic and nuanced manner.
Fantasy
Of course the definition of fantasy is contested. But for purposes of offering an 
initial sketch, we could say, following Freud, that it denotes a framing device 
that subjects use to ‘protect’ themselves from the anxiety associated with the 
idea that there is no ultimate guarantee or law underlying and guiding our so-
cial existence. This guarantee has been given many names, certainly when one 
takes the long historical view: God, Reason, the Senses, the Laws of History, and 
so on. But this guarantee can in principle take any form whatsoever, including a 
seemingly innocuous ‘piece of Household stuff’, such as a trunk.
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With this as background we can say that fantasy also furnishes the subject with 
a schema that mediates between publicly affirmed ideals on the one hand, and 
the darker side of those aspirations and aims on the other hand – a side that 
subjects would rather not consciously or officially affirm. The operation of fan-
tasy is especially evident when responses to events appear disproportionately 
charged or invested with emotion, sometimes qualified as ‘irrational’ emotion. 
This is particularly clear when an ‘Other’ (immigrant Other, racial Other, reli-
gious Other, sexed Other, and so on) is cast as an urgent threat to someone’s 
(or a nation’s) ‘way of life’. But the logic of fantasy is such that features of its 
narrative tend to resist public official disclosure because they are in some way 
socially prohibited or unsettling. This is the transgressive dimension of fantasy. 
For example, while it may be possible for the tabloid press to blame immigrants 
or single mothers for many of the problems with the welfare system, it is not so 
often that one finds individuals making such pronouncements in a public, of-
ficial capacity.
Consequently, individual and collective fantasies often appear to make it diffi-
cult to contest and debate the norms of a social practice in an open or democrat-
ic fashion. The documented phenomenon of ‘dog-whistling’ can serve to briefly 
illustrate this idea. Dog-whistle politics typically concerns the transmission of 
implicit messages to a select group of voters – messages that contravene a wide-
ly and officially affirmed social norm. In the UK context, Michael Howard’s ‘Are 
you thinking what we’re thinking’ electoral campaign of 2005 is a classic exam-
ple. Take the claim that ‘it’s not racist to impose limits on immigration’. Just like 
Freud’s account of dream censorship, such statements appear incontestable, 
yet the emotional charge in the expressions suggests there is something more at 
stake: it taps into fantasies about how (e.g. immigrant) ‘others’ are responsible 
for the theft of, or threat to, our ‘way of life’. A Freudian-inspired conception of 
fantasy adds to our understanding of these phenomena because it supplements 
accounts that rely exclusively or heavily on ‘false consciousness’ or ‘moral cor-
ruption’ to explain them. Of course, questions of ‘truth’ and ‘morality’ do have 
an important role to play in coming to terms with social and political phenom-
ena. But the appeal to fantasy and desire suggests that intimations of anxiety in 
the face of uncertainty and contingency are powerful drivers of such responses, 
and that these must be taken seriously because they help shape the significance 
we attach to the ‘truth’ and ‘morality’ of such phenomena.
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Yet because fantasmatic desires are often transmitted implicitly, it becomes dif-
ficult to engage publicly and productively in related normative and political de-
bates. It follows that it also makes it difficult for scholars to assess the place 
and role of fantasy in critical political analysis more generally. This difficulty is 
compounded by the fact that understandings of fantasy tend to vary consider-
ably, as do understandings of the ideals in terms of which the role of fantasy can 
be critically assessed. What resources, then, are available to us for purposes of 
fleshing out with greater precision the logic of fantasy?
From a Lacanian point of view, one can start with the claim that ‘realizing one’s 
fantasy is impossible’. Realizing one’s fantasy is impossible in the sense that 
the subject (as a subject of desire) survives only insofar as its desire remains 
unsatisfied. Rather than satisfying desire, fantasy structures desire. It does so, 
usually, through a narrative that promises a fullness-to-come once a named or 
implied obstacle is overcome, or that foretells of disaster if the obstacle proves 
too threatening or insurmountable. But the obstacle, which often comes in the 
form of a prohibition or a threatening Other, transforms impossibility into a 
‘mere difficulty’, thereby creating the impression that its realization is at least 
potentially possible. The many obstacles identified as reasons for procrastinat-
ing, for example, create the impression that it is possible to achieve ‘fullness’ 
while also maintaining one’s self as a desiring subject. But the role of fantasy is 
actually to structure desire through a dialectic of fullness and lack, maintain-
ing one’s sense of being as a subject of desire. So the status psychoanalysis 
gives to fantasy is not so much epistemological as it is ontological and (as we 
will see shortly) ethical. In other words, the appeal to fantasy in critical analy-
sis should be understood primarily as a means to access the structure of desire 
and enjoyment, rather than as a means of dismissing a belief or worldview as 
untrue or irrational because it does not conform to a particular understanding 
of reality. 
What gives a narrative a specifically psychoanalytic inflection, then, is the fan-
tasmatic logic structuring the subject’s desire. It furnishes the subject with an 
ideal and an impediment to the realization of an ideal, investing the narrative 
with a beatific or horrific hue. The logic of fantasy also produces an enjoyment 
(Lacan’s jouissance, also linked to Freud’s libido), often associated with the 
transgression of an ideal. Crucially, however, fantasy purports to offer a foun-
dational guarantee of sorts, in the sense that it offers the subject a degree of 
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protection from the anxiety associated with a direct confrontation with the radi-
cal contingency of social relations. Fantasy, therefore, is not merely a narrative 
with its potentially infinite variations at the level of content, although it is of 
course this too. It also has a certain ‘logic’ in which the subject’s very being is 
implicated: the disruption or dissolution of the logic leads to what Lacan calls 
aphanisis, a kind of vanishing of the subject as a subject of desire.
Nevertheless, Lacanians are fond of using the expression ‘crossing the fantasy’ 
as an ethical imperative, and this may give one the idea that what we must do is 
overcome or go beyond fantasy. In one sense, of course, this is true, but in what 
sense exactly? This is an important point because it is crucial that fantasy is 
not demonized or, to put it in milder terms, that we do not attribute to fantasy 
an exclusively negative valence, as those do who treat it epistemologically as a 
synonym for illusion or myth. This is because fantasy has an ontological status 
vis-à-vis the subject: it is a necessary condition for political mobilization and 
change as much as it is functional to social passivity and maintaining the status 
quo. From an ontological point of view, in other words, fantasies are inelimi-
nable and essential to action, whether these are characterized as normatively 
progressive or regressive. As Jacques-Alain Miller put it in a 1983 lecture,
if Lacan talks about the ‘crossing of the fantasy’, it is not in order to talk about the 
‘lifting or disappearance of the fantasy’. In the case of the fantasy, the question is 
rather […] to see what is behind, which is difficult, because there is nothing behind. 
Nonetheless, this is a nothing that can take various guises, and the crossing of the 
fantasy amounts to taking a walk on the side of those nothings.
(Miller 2010)
By appealing to the idea of a logic, then, I seek to emphasize how a Lacanian 
perspective (but certainly not only a Lacanian perspective) insists on investing 
fantasy with ontological and ethical significance. What many Lacanians call 
‘crossing the fantasy’ coincides with what I call the dissolution – or, to be more 
precise, a loosening – of this logic. It means not abandoning fantasy or going be-
yond fantasy, but rather acquiring a different relation to the fantasmatic object, 
one in which the subject is less ‘in thrall’ to it. This is one way to understand the 
Lacanian idea of an ‘ethics of the real’.
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Fantasy, Identity, Critique
So far I have focused on fantasy, but what about identity? How might we con-
ceptualize the relationship between fantasy and identity, and political identity 
in particular? In a first sweep we could say that the more we are invested in 
fantasies – the more we are locked into its logic – the more likely we are to read 
aspects of our experience in terms of that fantasmatic narrative. By appealing 
to a logic of fantasy, then, I aim to capture something about the way a subject is 
(strongly) attached to, or (over)invested in, a fantasmatic narrative.
Consider again the ‘rescue and protect’ fantasies described by Susan Faludi. 
There we saw how a powerful attachment to rescue fantasies translated very 
quickly into the ‘dogma’ of scripting firemen as heroes. Indeed the 9/11 commis-
sion itself was accused of dishonouring the ‘heroes’ when it tried to examine 
the pathways that led to the death of so many firefighters. The media, as well 
as New York mayors Bloomberg and Giuliani, clung to ‘the image of the New 
York firefighter as cavarlyman charging willingly, knowingly, to certain death’ 
(Faludi 2007: 381). And even when different stories were told about systemic, 
infrastructural, equipmental, and support failures before and after 9/11, these 
were quickly sidelined by the dominant narrative of rescue and heroism (Faludi 
2007: 381–3). This was as true of people’s responses to firefighers’ experiences as 
it was of people’s responses to the 9/11 event more generally.
For instance, many – individual firemen included – had stepped forward to cate-
gorically reject the honour of manly heroism. Instead they sought to offer a more 
complex picture of the events that unfolded in the run-up to, and aftermath of, 
9/11. But these stories did not receive much media attention at all. Faludi identi-
fies a series of initiatives which reveal a whole range of ‘alternative’ responses 
by ordinary citizens made visible through private recordings of people’s dreams 
and stories in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, and she charts how this nuance 
and creative energy was marginalized by the dominant fantasmatic narrative 
(Faludi 2007: 13–14, 377–380).
The implication is that the more invested one is in fantasy, the more one under-
stands and experiences life in accordance with this template; and conversely, 
the less likely we are to experience the creative potential involved in offering 
alternative readings and interpretations of events for purposes of political mo-
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bilisation or other forms of action. Certainly, the subject tends to use fantasy as 
a way to protect itself from ambiguities, uncertainties, and other features which 
evoke intimations of anxiety. But it is precisely those ambiguities that open up 
possibilities for critical distance and alternative becomings, including alterna-
tive political and economic pathways. So the problem lies not with fantasy as 
such so much with the way it engages the subject. In an important sense it is 
irrelevant that the fantasmatic script diverges from a ‘consensus reality’. The 
problem, rather, lies more with the subject’s strong attachment to, or libidinal 
overinvestment in, fantasy; and that this mode of attachment, in turn, has po-
litical and normative implications.
As a counterpoint to my reading of these events, consider Faludi’s earlier ref-
erence to fantasy and myth as something which concealed the ‘true’ facts of 
the matter. The fantasy of heroic men rescuing women and children from the 
inferno involved erasing the fact that most victims of the 9/11 attacks were men 
and that most women saved themselves. But consider now the possibility that 
as a matter of ‘hard facts’ more women were victims in the 9/11 attacks. The 
point here would be that this ‘fact’ would actually not necessarily change the 
way it gets caught in the logic of fantasy, by which I mean the way the subject 
is libidinally invested in its narrative. The Lacanian insight here suggests that 
understanding this aspect of fantasy is essential when trying to tease out more 
fully its political and ideological role.
What is at stake, then, is not so much the content of fantasy (and its conver-
gence with, or divergence from, a consensus reality) but the mode of our at-
tachment to this content. In a similar vein we can refer to Lacan’s often quoted 
insight that even if a patient’s wife really is sleeping around with other men, 
his jealousy can still be treated as excessive or pathological. So the ‘trouble’ 
with fantasy emerges in two steps. First, when a subject becomes hooked into its 
logic, in the sense that the subject has become strongly attached or gripped by it 
(this is the ideological aspect). Second, when this logic serves to bolster certain 
ideals that are not only contestable but also questionable (this is the normative 
aspect). This view of fantasy clearly forces into contact (and forces us to think 
the relation between) the ideological and normative aspects of critique. But this 
view provokes a further series of questions, namely, whether there are modes 
of subjectivity beyond those embodied in the logic of fantasy and desire, what 
their conditions of possibility might be, and with what implications for think-
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ing about social and political identity and practice (cf. Glynos 2008; Glynos and 
Howarth 2007). These are questions that have yet to receive sufficient detailed 
empirical and critical attention in the literature. There are, however, several 
studies that move decisively in this direction. Consider, for example, Capitalism 
and Christianity, American Style.
Fantasy and Identity, American Style
In an incisive critical analysis of contemporary political life in the United States, 
Bill Connolly is alert to the potency of fantasy in shaping the American social 
and political scene. In this respect there are many points of convergence be-
tween his and Faludi’s analyses. However, in Capitalism and Christianity, Ameri-
can Style Connolly is explicit in trying not to remain at the level of fantasmatic 
content. If not in name, then at least in sense, the aspects and role of fantasy I 
have outlined thus far find themselves neatly expressed in this study.
Connolly offers a powerful and fairly comprehensive diagnosis and critique of 
what he calls America’s ‘evangelical-capitalist resonance machine’. Emerging 
in the 1970s in the wake of the demise of Keynesian economics, the evangelical-
capitalist machine produced a political programme whose demands provoked 
resonances across creedal and class differences – demands for lower taxes for 
the rich, demands for lower welfare expenditure, demands for pre-emptive wars, 
demands to affirm as necessary the collateral damage wrought by the Abu Gh-
raibs and Guantanamos of this world, demands for punitive immigration meas-
ures, demands for less state interference on matters of consumer choice, such 
as the choice to purchase an SUV, and so on. These are demands that, according 
to Connolly, sideline more egalitarian, pluralist, and ecological demands, and 
for this reason it is crucial to understand the process by which these processes 
of chaining take place.
Central to Connolly’s diagnosis is the distinction he draws between ethos and 
belief – a distinction that is similar to the fantasmatic mode/content distinc-
tion discussed earlier. It is a distinction which is expressed in different ways, 
the spirituality/creed pair being one. In this view, the evangelical-capitalist ma-
chine resonates because the spiritualities coursing through the evangelical and 
capitalist wings of the ‘machine’ reverberate with one another – more specifi-
cally, they spring from a common and deep sense of entitlement and revenge. Of 
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course, these spiritualities are not normally expressed in a public-official capac-
ity. As noted earlier, this resistance to public-official disclosure is often a char-
acteristic feature of the logic of fantasy. As Connolly puts it ‘our behaviour may 
express intensities we officially deny’ (Connolly 2008: 8; see also 4). In fact, this 
transgressive dimension often functions as a potent driver of collective iden-
tification and mobilisation precisely because it remains silent (Connolly 2008: 
54). In this view, fantasy’s power derives from the enjoyment embodied in such 
shared transgression. Dog-whistle politics, we recall, is sustained in part by 
means of stoking precisely this enjoyment through the deft use of silences. Si-
lences facilitate the practice of plausible deniability, which is a tried and tested 
way of targeting and binding particular constituencies. It rarely fails to provoke 
the expected reaction of flummoxed impotence on the part of their liberal crit-
ics, transmitting paroxysms of joy to those ‘in the know’ and, in doing so, fur-
ther consolidating the collective identification such enjoyment underpins.
This is not to say there are no exceptions to the ‘silence rule’. But such exceptions 
can be said to underline the tactical and strategic significance of the public-offi-
cial silences. Connolly refers to an incident in 2005, in which a group of parents 
and community citizens in Dover, Pennsylvania, succeeded in their political and 
legal campaign against a local school board’s decision to introduce ‘Intelligent 
Design’ into the classroom. In response to this action, the American evangelical 
leader Pat Robertson addressed the community in the following way:
I’d like to say to the good citizens of Dover: if there is disaster in your area don’t turn 
to God, you just rejected him from your city. And don’t wonder why he hasn’t helped 
you when problems begin, if they begin. I’m not saying that they will, but if they do, 
just remember, you just voted God out of your city. And if that’s the case, don’t ask for 
his help because he might not be there.
(Robertson 2005, as cited in Connolly 2008: 52)
Connolly’s central thesis suggests that this evangelically-expressed ethos of en-
titlement, resentment and revenge resonates with the ethos underpinning much 
cowboy capitalism. Anyone can make real his American dream of hitting the 
jackpot, so long as one brings a little invention and athletic energy to one or 
another of the widely available ‘how-to-get-rich’ manuals… and maybe a bit of 
luck which, in any case, will be well deserved. This is a potent headline fantasy 
which is commonly shared, and high levels of investment in this fantasy may 
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go some way to explaining both why a substantial (near-majority) proportion 
of twenty-year olds believe they’ll be earning salaries in their fifties which will 
put them in the top 5 per cent of the population (Connolly 2008: 33-4) and why 
guilt and ressentiment are not unexpected supports of associated regressive and 
reactionary political demands when fantasmatic ideals fail to materialize.
What are the implications of such fantasmatic analysis for social and politi-
cal identity? Clearly, these fantasmatic narratives fuel and reinforce a sense of 
resentment and entitlement. It makes it possible for those lower down on the 
wealth and income scale to identify with those on much higher rungs, consoli-
dating their collective political position against those who preach egalitarianism 
and the virtues of care for the other and for the environment. It also makes it pos-
sible for an alliance across class and creed to consolidate itself by identifying a 
common enemy in those who threaten these visions of plenty and glory. Though 
this is not explicitly or systematically thematised by Connolly, what appears 
crucial in understanding the sense of resentment and entitlement and the way 
this resonates outwardly throughout the evangelical-capitalist machine is the 
strength by which subjects are attached to, or invested in, underlying fantasies.
Many might say, of course, that this powerful attachment to fantasy betrays 
a predictable and dangerous narrow-mindedness. But the creative potential 
of this mode of attachment should not be underestimated, since the ethos as-
sociated with fantasmatic overinvestment can be, and is, regularly deployed 
innovatively. As new circumstances arise and new grievances emerge, these 
must be articulated as demands that are compatible with the more familiar 
ethos of resentment and entitlement. This is a creative act. But – and I think 
this is by no means incompatible with what Connolly says – I would add that 
this is a ‘closed creativity’. It is ‘closed’ precisely in the sense that a logic can 
be discerned, a logic linked to a mode of overinvested fantasmatic attachment 
and thus to the tendency to fit all that one encounters into a mould that pre-
serves this mode of attachment – in this case a mode cashed out as a function 
of ressentiment. And here it is worth emphasizing how a logic rooted in ressenti-
ment and revenge can be as effective in inflecting progressive demands as it is in 
inflecting regressive demands.
Moving beyond the logic of fantasy, then, entails the adoption of a distinct 
ethos, not so much a distinct set of beliefs. Such an ethos promises greater po-
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litical potential because the frame through which the world is experienced is no 
longer understood as grounded in an external guarantee. A key role of fantasy is 
to protect us from ambiguity by providing us with a script with which to shuffle 
vulnerability and uncertainty to the margins. Once detached from fantasmatic 
guarantees, we can begin to discern a more expansive, ‘open’ creative potential 
in the uncertainties and ambiguities that become visible – including potential 
for political mobilisation. As Connolly puts it, ‘[t]o accept a messy conception 
of the world is to emphasise simultaneously its capacity for surprise, its tragic 
potential, and possible lines of creative action to take’ (Connolly 2008: 10). 
The political significance of sustaining a distinction between the content and 
mode of fantasy is that the adoption of a different mode may facilitate the con-
struction of linkages across a wide range of doctrinal elements into an alterna-
tive counter-hegemonic formation: ‘it opens a window to the formation of a new 
political assemblage’ (Connolly 2008: 61; see also 9, 16). So what is interesting 
from the point of view of political and ideological critique is not only the specific 
content of fantasies – this is certainly important from a normative point of view. 
What is crucial as well, especially from the point of view of those concerned 
with the possibilities of social transformation and of those espousing the value 
of a deep pluralism, is the mode of the subject’s attachment to that content. This 
is how I would read Connolly’s remark that ‘[i]t is important, for both political 
and ethical reasons, to distinguish those who fill a doctrine with extreme enti-
tlement and revenge from those who do not do so’ (Connolly 2008: 52).
Fantasy and Political Identity, Zionist Style
The relationship between fantasy and identity can be further explored with ref-
erence to a study by Jacqueline Rose, who tackles a theme similar to the one 
pre-occupying Connolly, and who invokes the mode/content distinction in a 
similar, albeit more implicit, way. Rose’s intervention centres on a question of-
ten provoked by Israelis and Jews who criticize Israeli state policy – a question, 
however, that was also very clearly and visibly on the lips of many US citizens 
and commentators in the wake of the US government’s decision to go to war in 
Afganistan and Irak. Iterating the formulation of the question by Daniel Ben-
Simon and Gideon Levy she asks: Is the true friend of a nation state the loving 
critic or the unthinking patriot? Is the true friend of a nation one who identifies 
with it automatically or one who wants it to be just? (Rose 2005: 134)
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This, however, produces a further question: ‘What would happen to a political 
or religious identity, even the most binding, if it could see itself as contingent, as 
something that might have taken another path? Can you be devoted to an iden-
tity – or would you be differently devoted to an identity – if you knew it was also 
unsure?’ (Rose 2005: 96) Rose acknowledges the difficulty of going beyond rigid 
forms of identification governed by the logic of fantasy, thereby foregrounding 
a crucial challenge: ‘How do you begin to address… the problem of a political 
identity whose strength in the world, indeed its ability to survive as an identity, 
relies on its not being able, or willing, to question itself?’ (Rose 2005: 152) One 
pathway open to us – the pathway Rose explores – is the genealogical pathway. 
She suggests that this sort of self-questioning can be found at the root of Israeli 
national identity. Rose implies that this sort of self-questioning can be brought 
more firmly into consciousness through a historical inquiry whose aim is to re-
veal the irreducible pluralism lying at the origins of the Israeli national idea and 
ideal (Rose 2005: 107).
In The Question of Zion, with which she explicitly calls to mind Edward Said’s 
1979 The Question of Palestine, Jacqueline Rose offers us an exemplary account 
of how fantasy and political identity intersect. Based on a series of lectures de-
livered at Princeton University in 2003, she attempts to answer two questions 
arising out of her attempt to grapple with the curious turn of events in which 
‘one of the most persecuted peoples of the world… [came] to embody some of 
the worst cruelties of the modern nation-state’ (Rose 2005: 115-6). First, how did 
the Zionist self-image of Israel first arise and what were its dominant and less 
dominant strands (the historical question); and second, what is it ‘about Zion-
ism that commands such passionate and seemingly intractable allegiance’ (the 
psychoanalytic question) (Rose 2005: xiii). 
Israeli views about Israel, argues Rose, are underpinned by a narrative which is 
hardly ever talked about: Zionism (Rose 2005: xii). But this ‘not talked-about Zi-
onism’ is actually a particular version of Zionism that was by no means the only 
one that was originally on offer. The interpretation that has come to define Zion-
ism today is Theodor Herzl’s interpretation – an interpretation very much rooted 
in an earlier messianic outlook. This is an important historical point, according 
to Rose, because messianism tends to flourish in dark times, and messianic leg-
end tends to ‘drench’ itself ‘in “uninhibited fantasies” about the catastrophic 
aspects of redemption’, wherein a prominent place is reserved for settling scores 
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and thus satisfying a desire for historic revenge (Rose 2005: 17, 19). Theodor Her-
zl’s The Jewish State won the hearts of the European Jewish masses because it 
appeared in 1940 in the thick of war, in the context of ongoing hardship and 
despair, and because he was very good at exploiting anti-Semitism as a way to 
convince state leaders (whether of Central Europe or of Turkey) of the need, vi-
ability, and validity of a separate Jewish state. 
In this way Herzl retained the ethos of a past messianism rooted in redemption 
and revenge, but transposed it from a religious to a political register: ‘Secular 
Zionism’s revolution was to move salvation from the heaven to the plains: “[it] 
does not expect the return to Palestine to be brought about by a miracle, but 
desires to prepare the way by its own efforts”’ (Rose 2005: 33). Nevertheless, 
Rose finds traces of messianic redemption in the writing of major visionaries, 
advocates, and historians of Zionism, such as Herzl, Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, 
and Scholem (Rose 2005: 28–43). Use of terms such as ‘Kingdom of Israel’ and 
‘Congregation of Israel’ cannot but conjure all the religious associations it ex-
plicitly disavows: ‘We are talking of the “slow but steady” penetration of the civ-
ic culture by a vision that many of Israel’s citizens do not explicitly embrace […] 
Messianism, as unconscious inspiration, is in the air and soil of Israel’ (Rose 
2005: 54). A very particular expression of entitlement and revenge was thus 
set up, within which to articulate grievances emanating from European anti-
semitism and the pogroms of Eastern Europe. These grievances were put to an 
international audience and persuasively articulated as a need and demand for 
the inauguration of a new state.
But Rose shows that there was an alternative sensibility in play at the moment 
of Zionism’s inception, also pointing out that its one nation-state form was not a 
necessary one. Her historical and documentary analysis reveals that Herzl’s vi-
sion was not the only way Zionism’s unconscious dimension could be, nor was, 
articulated (Rose 2005: 68). Herzl pressed this unconscious dimension in the 
service of a very specific set of political objectives culminating in the establish-
ment of a separate nation state in Palestine. There was a powerfully articulated 
alternative however. The dissenters’ way was to make visible both the dangers 
and positive potential of this unconscious Messianic aspect, advocating the 
need to be attentive to this dimension of Zionism. It has been suggested that 
Jews and Israelis often do not know that there was this history of dissent (El-
lis 2002: 35, 138). Martin Buber, Hannah Arendt, Hans Kohn, and Ahad Ha’am 
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each believed that Zionism could have taken a different path to the one it did 
take, and to this day their views continue to provide a ‘resonant, melancholic, 
counternarrative to [Zionism’s messianic version of the] birth of a nation-state’ 
(Rose 2005: 70).
Martin Buber, for example, envisioned not partition but partnership – a partner-
ship between two nations, a Jewish nation and an Arab nation, with equal polit-
ical rights and ‘united in the enterprise of developing their common homeland 
and in the federal management of shared matters’ (as cited in Rose 2005: 75). The 
presentation of a two-nation state as an alternative to Herzl’s one-nation state, 
however, was underpinned by a worry about the ‘absolutizing’ ethos critics dis-
cerned at the root of Herzl’s proposal. Hans Kohn, in particular, was explicit 
in suggesting that an ‘absolute’ form of nationalism ‘allows you the illusion of 
mastering the unmasterable: the enigma of life, destructive gesticulations, the 
dark beast… It allows you, like the ego, to believe you could be sufficient unto 
yourself’ (Rose 2005: 80). In light of Buber, Kohn, and Arendt’s writings, then, 
it is clear that Rose feels that ‘Zionism… had the opportunity to forge a model of 
nationhood, neither belligerently nor pre-emptively, but ambivalent, uncertain, 
obscure, something closer to this disquieting and transformative space. But did 
not take it’ (Rose 2005: 86).
The consequences of being firmly and resolutely attached to a political identity 
through a logic of fantasmatic overinvestment is that political options appear 
stark and dichotomic: ‘So often in discussion of Zionism we seem to be faced 
with a false alternative: acknowledge… suffering or castigate the injustice of 
the Israeli state (the charge that any critique of Israel is anti-Semitic merely 
rides on the back of this false choice)’ (Rose 2005: 115). Alternative and more 
creative political pathways are blocked off in this way. And so a messianic ‘mili-
tarization of suffering’ comes to bolster an ethos of revenge and entitlement in 
a zero-sum game, supporting and supported by the belief, for example, that 
‘Israeli submission would invite further aggression’. ‘When we seem weak’ says 
a former adviser to the Likud government, ‘we are attacked’ (Rose 2005: 131).5 
Certainly, a genealogy of Zionism shows how the militarization of suffering and 
5 “According to this logic, every achievement of the Palestinians in negotiations is perceived 
as a crushing internal defeat (Yasser Arafat’s return to Gaza after the Oslo Accord became a 
national humiliation)” (Rose 2005: 131).
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the nation-state became victorious within it. But it also shows that it was not 
necessary. 
Mourning as a Pathway Through Fantasy?
Returning to our earlier discussion of the US reaction to 9/11, we recall similar 
sorts of consequences flowing from fantasmatic overinvestments. Of course, an 
important part of Susan Faludi’s analysis pointed to an epistemological, and 
thus fairly conventional, non-psychoanalytic understanding of fantasy as myth 
or illusion (see also Faludi 2007: 385, 387, 388). However, in discussing possible 
ways forward she introduces an interesting and important shift in perspective, 
disarticulating ‘truth’ from reality and rearticulating it to an ethical stance, sug-
gesting we look at the ‘truth’ of our weakness and vulnerability in the eye and 
have the character to address that directly (Faludi 2007: 377).
A turn to a ‘truth in weakness’ is clearly promising because it appears to go be-
yond somewhat staid ‘false-consciousness’ conceptualizations of fantasy. This 
idea, however, is not developed in detail. Nevertheless, this is a lead we should 
perhaps follow rather cautiously since, as we saw in the analysis presented to us 
by Jacqueline Rose, nothing progressive or ethical necessarily follows from sim-
ply acknowledging and affirming weakness and vulnerability. Much depends on 
how this is done. In fact a shift from ‘mastery’ to ‘weakness’ can easily serve to 
preserve a subjective mode of fantasmatic overinvestment. Rose points out, for 
example, that Israel, one of the most powerful and bellicose nations in the world, 
“still chooses to present itself as eternally on the defensive, as though weakness 
were a weapon, and vulnerability its greatest strength” (Rose 2005: xiii).
That nothing progressive or ethical automatically follows a shift to the position 
of victim and vulnerability is something other scholars are keen to point out too. 
Consider Wendy Brown’s discussion of ‘wounded attachments’ (Brown 1995: 52-
76). Brown also speaks to the dangers of fantasmatic overinvestment from the 
point of view of the position of vulnerability and injury. Her worry is that making 
past and present injury the basis of political demands often ends up reinforcing 
one’s psychic attachment to this injury as well as reinscribing the (fantasmatic) 
conditions which make such injury possible. The claim here is that the enjoy-
ment (jouissance) procured in ‘reliving a certain punishing recognition reassures 
us not only of our own place (identity) but also of the presence of the order out 
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of which that identity was forged and to which we remain perversely beholden’ 
(Brown 2001: 56). It is easy to underestimate the debilitating effects of ressenti-
ment and guilt associated with the thought that others are responsible for the 
theft of our enjoyment. If so, we can hypothesize that the enjoyment associated 
with our investment in fantasies of victimization and rescue may constrain the 
possibility of transformation just as much as fantasies of control and mastery. 
The possibility of transformation may thus be facilitated through the adoption 
of a different mode of enjoyment and relation to fantasy, something that ‘might 
take shape as a certain ironic ethos or as a spirit of radical, critical patriotism – 
or it might take some other form, as yet unthought’ (Brown 2001: 59).
Perhaps, then, Faludi’s turn to vulnerability as an alternative point of political 
identification taps into an important intuition that may actually lead us down 
a path that avoids the pitfalls identified by Rose and Brown – a path that both 
Rose and Brown could affirm. Judith Butler’s work on mourning is helpful in 
this respect (cf. Eng and Kazanjian 2003), offering one way of thinking through 
the Lacanian idea of ‘crossing the fantasy’. The appeal to mourning is attractive 
for Butler because it points to the notion of loss, and the pain linked to loss, as a 
potential catalyst for subjective transformation and political engagement:
Perhaps […] one mourns when one accepts that by the loss one undergoes one will 
be changed, possibly for ever. Perhaps mourning has to do with agreeing to undergo 
a transformation (perhaps one should say submitting to a transformation) the full 
result of which one cannot know in advance. There is losing, as we know, but there 
is also the transformative effect of loss, and this latter cannot be charted or planned. 
One can try to choose it, but it may be that this experience of transformation decon-
stitutes choice at some level.
(Butler 2004: 21).
Mourning achieves this because it demonstrates that loss is, at a fundamental 
level, relational in character:
[T]he attachment to “you” is part of what composes who “I” am. If I lose you, under 
these conditions, then I not only mourn the loss, but I become inscrutable to myself. 
Who “am” I, without you? When we lose some of these ties by which we are consti-
tuted, we do not know who we are or what to do. On one level, I think I have lost 
“you” only to discover that “I” have gone missing as well. At another level, perhaps 
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what I have lost “in” you, that for which I have no ready vocabulary, is a relationality 
that is composed neither exclusively of myself nor you, but is to be conceived as the 
tie by which those terms are differentiated and related.
(Butler 2004: 22)
Mourning thus creates a kind of ‘mindfulness of vulnerability’ that can become 
the basis of political claims, an ethos clearly opposed to claims animated by 
ressentiment, and opening up a pathway to alternative forms of political iden-
tification, including national identifications. As Butler puts it, ‘[w]e have to 
consider the obituary as an act of nation-building’ (Butler 2004: 34). Mourning 
can produce a different way of imagining community or thinking about national 
identity. Since all of us have some notion of what it is to have lost somebody, 
Butler suggests we can think of constructing a (tenuous) ‘we’ in relation to loss 
(Butler 2004: 20).
The conditions which make life grievable, are thus central to a form of politics 
that is non-belligerent or beyond ressentiment. When soldiers’ coffins (of both 
sides) are shuffled to the margins of public official and popular media discourse, 
when there is no place for public and performative recognition of our common 
vulnerability or of ourselves as always in a process of ‘becoming’ rather than 
as an always-already ‘us’, then those conditions are lacking. What we get is a 
‘denial of this vulnerability through a fantasy of mastery (an institutionalized 
fantasy of mastery) [that] can fuel the instruments of war’ (Butler 2004: 29). A re-
pudiation of mourning is manifest, for example, in Bush’s declaration ten days 
after Sept 11 that ‘we have finished grieving and that now it is time for resolute 
action to take the place of grief’ (ibid.)
Conclusion
Fantasy is a useful device with which to explore and probe the political and ide-
ological dimension of a practice or narrative. This is because it foregrounds the 
combined significance of the symbolic and affective dimensions of life. Moreo-
ver, a psychoanalytic perspective can facilitate a move away from an epistemo-
logical or moralizing understanding of fantasy, placing the emphasis instead 
on its ontological and ethical status. In this view, it is not simply the content of 
fantasy that is important, but also the mode of our attachment to it, our libidinal 
investment in it. With detachment from (rather than abandonment of) fantasy 
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comes the possibility of affirming an ethos of becoming and embracing a greater 
potential for resignification, which is a key precondition for a form of political 
mobilization marked by deep pluralism.
The trouble with fantasmatic over-investment appears in an especially stark 
form in George Lucas’s Star Wars epic. At a key moment in Star Wars Episode 3: 
The Revenge of the Sith, Anakin – who is later baptized ‘Darth Vader’ by Darth 
Sidius, Lord of the Sith – reveals to Master Yoda how, in his sleep, he has seen a 
future in which a loved one suffers pain and death. In response to this revelation 
Yoda cautions him as follows:
Careful you must be when sensing the future, Anakin. The fear of loss is a path to the 
dark side.
But Anakin insists that he will not let his horrific vision come true. So Master 
Yoda is forced to be more explicit about what is at stake. He says:
Death is a natural part of life. Rejoice for those around you who transform into the 
Force. Mourn them, do not. Miss them, do not. Attachment leads to jealousy. The 
shadow of greed, that is.
[You must] train yourself to let go of everything you fear to lose.
Is the model of the Jedi expressed here by Master Yoda a model for the subject 
we can, or even ought to, emulate? Indeed, what kind of subject is Yoda call-
ing forth? Some might say that what is at stake is precisely the possibility of an 
ethics beyond desire and the mode of fantasmatic attachment that this presup-
poses. There is enough ambiguity in Master Yoda’s formulation, however, for us 
to remain fairly confident that others will disagree.
Either way, what I hope to have shown by engaging with a number of case il-
lustrations is the value of drawing a distinction between fantasmatic mode 
and fantasmatic content on the one hand, and, on the other hand, between a 
mode of enjoyment associated with closure (an ‘ideological’ mode of being) and 
a mode of enjoyment associated with openness (an ‘ethical’ mode of being). 
While the former has a logic, more specifically a fantasmatic logic of overin-
vestment that grips through transgression, guilt, and ressentiment, the latter 
escapes attempts at capture – indeed, it appears to entail the dissolution or loos-
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ening of such a logic, ushering forth a different sort of ethos that signals a com-
mitment to recognizing and exploring the possibilities of the new in contingent 
encounters.
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